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A B S T R A C T
European universities have come under reform pressures to make them instruments of social and economic
development, compromising their earlier status as socially buffered institutions. The aim of this paper was to
investigate the hypothesis that tensions and inconsistencies in recent higher education reforms in Poland trace
back to a fundamental conflict between institutional and instrumental visions of the university. Findings suggest
an intersection of “rationalized myths” that locks the university sector in a “corset” experienced by stakeholders
more like a return to the Soviet past than the way of a better future. Seen through the lens of second-order
systems theory, these findings problematize the assumption that the historically grounded institution of the
university can be re-oriented as an instrument for achieving state priorities with a mere balance of carrots and
state-of-the-art sticks.
1. Introduction
With enrollments in post-secondary education across Europe ex-
ceeding 60% (World Bank, 2017), there is hardly a European family
whose future is unaffected by the fate of the university and its institu-
tional cousins or descendants. Since the 1960s, with the rising tides of
massification, institutions of higher education have become central not
just to the future of individuals, but to social and economic develop-
ment, rendering them “central institutions of human society”
(Marginson et al., 2018). In the European Union, governments and the
public alike see the university as “one of the few institutions that can
help Europe to come out of its current multidimensional crisis”
(Gornitzka and Maassen, 2017). In a manner consistent with the un-
derstanding of organizations as open systems responsive to change in
their environment, European policymakers have attempted to use both
incentives and mandates to stimulate universities to produce employ-
able graduates and marketable innovations.
As a result, institutions that have historically functioned as auton-
omous associations of masters and students, shielded from social and
economic pressures (Shaw & Lenartowicz, 2016), are now inundated
with reform efforts to turn them into engines of national and global
development (Maassen and Olsen, 2007). Reform initiatives in higher
education across Europe have tended to reflect an instrumental vision
of the university, which – by the logic of the reformers – should cease to
be isolated from industry and society, and instead become “an instru-
ment for shifting national political agendas” (Olsen, 2007, p. 30; Kwiek,
2015, p. 79). This stands in sharp contrast to the institutional vision of
the university dating back to medieval times, in which rationally
proven knowledge is pursued and disseminated in “a rule-governed
community of scholars” (Olsen, 2007, p. 30), protected by the state
from the short-term interests of societal interest groups. Ramirez and
Tiplic (2014) describe the cultural shift currently facing European
universities as being driven by “the triumph of models of the university
as socially embedded rationalized organizations,” in contrast to a view
of universities as “socially buffered and historically grounded institu-
tions” (p. 440).
The current shift has not escaped controversy, as “social dis-
embeddedness” has been a defining quality of the European university
since its founding (Krücken, 2003, p. 324). Nowhere in Europe is the
sensitive dance of disembeddedness and accountability more evident
than in the post-communist states of Central and Eastern Europe, where
the notion of higher education as “an instrument for shifting national
political agendas” (Olsen, 2007, p. 30) awakens memories of the pre-
vious instance of strong state intervention in the inner workings of
universities – the communist era. To date, it has not been subject to
empirical research how transnational trends in higher education reform
intersect with the organizational identities of higher education in-
stitutions in states with established academic traditions, where uni-
versities served as key instruments in the “state socialist modernization
project” (Péteri, 2000, p. 280).
Poland provides a particularly instructive case study. In the period
of real socialism, the Polish system of higher education was subjected to
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central planning in most aspects of its functioning (Zysiak, 2016) – yet
traditional social buffers around universities enabled protection for
pockets of academic freedom consistent with the pre-war conception of
the university as a self-governing community of scholars (Simonová and
Antonowicz, 2006). When the country regained independence, uni-
versities won extensive autonomy and returned to a model of academic
self-rule, entrenching the institutional vision of the university through
an association between national and academic self-determination
(Shaw, 2018).
It is not coincidental that even as Polish governments have at-
tempted to shift the legislative framework towards the instrumental
blueprint through two waves of reforms in 2010–2011 and 2018–2019,
Polish higher education remains as one of the few European holdouts of
a governance model approximating the traditional blueprint for “a rule-
governed community of scholars.” (Kwiek, 2015; Shaw, 2018). Kwiek
(2015) hypothesized on the pages of this journal that at the roots of the
tensions observed in Poland might lie “a conflict between the institu-
tional vision of the university shared by the academic community (a
value-based ‘community of scholars’) and the instrumental vision
shared by the policy-making community (an externally-driven, na-
tional, goal oriented ‘organization’)” which is in fact a conflict of
“fundamental values” (p. 87). This study was an attempt to put Kwiek’s
(2015) hypothesis to empirical investigation.
The theoretical framework employed in this study drew on second-
order systems theory, where human organizations are conceptualized as
complex and living systems, subject to the principle of autopoiesis - a
process of continuous and recursive self-production governing all of the
system’s activities (Luhmann, 2009). As Kwiek (2015) hypothesized a
difference in fundamental values held by influential actors belonging to
two distinct communities, a systems approach would suggests an in-
vestigation of the blueprint or blueprints governing the self-organiza-
tion of the academic system(s) now subject to external pressure for
change. From a systems perspective, what determines the exchange
between the academic system and its policy environment is its own
blueprint of identity constructed through language – or to use a bio-
logical image, the “DNA” governing its self-production (Lenartowicz,
2015). Based on these assumptions, the author of this study sought to
examine the distinctions that make up a resistant pattern of organiza-
tional identity embedded in public universities’ self-description, at a
time when these institutions were subject to both mandates and in-
centives envisioned by policymakers as stimuli towards change. To this
end, the research investigated the images and rationalized myths in-
voked in support of the fundamental values seen as essential to the
nature of the university by key players in the system.
This study looks at the governance reforms of the last decade in
Polish higher education from the perspective of two groups of leading
actors in the system – architects of a reform in 2010/2011 that in-
troduced “fundamentally new rules of the game” following the
European blueprint, and leaders of academic institutions charged with
implementing the reforms. The article compares their perceptions of the
reforms and the “rationalized myths” used to make sense of their
meaning. The author also explores possible trajectories for future
change and the challenges faced in the process of positioning uni-
versities as engines of development for industry and society.
2. Theoretical framework
In the past decade, the European policy community passed legisla-
tion based on the assumption that with a combination of legislative
mandates and a generous infusion of external investments, the aca-
demic community can be taught to produce employable graduates and
marketable innovations. This approach was consistent with the early
understanding of organizations as open systems dependent upon their
environment for information and resources (e.g. Von Bertalanffy,
1968). The open systems perspective, conceptualizing change within
the organization as a result of a change in the environment, was
popularized in management practice by Katz and Kahn (1966), and
served as the conceptual foundation of public intervention to finance
change in autonomous organizations. Early systems theory, however,
failed to account for the mechanisms of inducing and sustaining such
change, or to propose conceptually consistent grounds for the evalua-
tion of external interventions (Lenartowicz, 2018).
This challenge taken up by second-order systems theorists, with a
significant breakthrough emerging out of Niklas Luhmann’s con-
ceptualization of organizations as autopoietic systems. Autopoiesis, a
term first used in biology, refers to a system’s perpetuation of its own
identity pattern. While biological systems perpetuate themselves
through material processes, Luhmann (2009) posited that social sys-
tems accomplish this by means of communication. Much as a cell’s
communication with its environment is guided by the cell’s own
“agenda” encoded in its DNA, the interactions between an organization
and its ecosystem are guided by its own survival interests – i.e. what the
organization perceives as vital for the generation of its own identity
pattern. Therefore, change in the environment will only produce
change in an autopoietic social system to the extent that it is perceived
as relevant to its own self-generation. External stimuli irrelevant to a
system’s identity pattern but impossible to ignore will be treated as
“perturbations” and mitigated with “compensations” – behaviors aimed
at restoring the system’s ability to self-perpetuate. Seidl (2016) suggests
that lasting organizational change is one that alters a system’s identity
pattern (p. 113). Lenartowicz (2018) claims that the only change
worthy of public resources is not merely one that changes superficial
practice, but shifts the pattern of identity embedded in an organiza-
tion’s daily, discursive self-description.
Many believe that the conceptualization of social systems as au-
topoietic constitutes a major milestone in the development of organi-
zation theory, with Magalhaes and Sanchez (2009) going as far as to say
that it may become its new unifying framework. This paper attempts to
put the autopoietic conceptualization to empirical use in an examina-
tion of Kwiek’s hypothesis regarding the conflict of fundamental values
in Polish higher education. If such conflict of values exists, what are its
lines of demarcation – and more importantly, do these lines coincide
with the boundaries of recognizably different organizational systems
with distinct patterns of identity? Across the different types of public
institutions of higher education, are pressures to improve external re-
levance seen as consistent or inconsistent with their different identity
patterns? Is there evidence for change in any of the organizational
identity patterns as a result of reform? If the tenets of second order
systems theory hold true, the answers to these questions will offer clues
as to the durability of change induced through external stimuli in the
context of Polish higher education.
To investigate the interaction between external stimuli for change
and identity patterns in major types of Polish HEIs, this study sought to
uncover the “rationalized myths” (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Schriewer,
2009) of the university held by key players in the system, both pol-
icymakers and academic leaders. Rationalized myths are accepted
narratives “depicting various formal structures as rational means to the
attainment of desirable ends” (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 345). In the
context of this study, this notion, derived from institutional theory,
served as a conceptual bridge towards the operationalization of orga-
nizational “DNA” – an experimental key to try to unlock the organi-
zational pattern of identity.
Rationalized myths are not mythical in the sense of being false, but
in the sense of presenting a proscribed construction of the world and
conditioning behavior. It was assumed in this study that rationalized
myths constitute the singular “genes” of an organization’s autopoietic
“DNA”. Support for the use of this particular concept came in part from
the neo-institutional insight that rationalized myths play a particularly
significant role in organizations that experience high levels of en-
vironmental uncertainty and an ongoing need for social legitimacy –
such as current institutions of higher education. It is hypothesized that
policy actors and academic leaders in different types of institutions
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function in diverse social systems, and they will therefore communicate
and enact different structures for attaining different desired ends.
3. An authoritative blueprint for governance reform
In recent years, the “rationalized myth” prevalent in European
policymaking conceptualizes HEIs as a quasi-markets, governed by
mechanisms of managed competition overseen by the state (Agasisti
and Catalano, 2006). It emerged in response to calls for higher educa-
tion to become more efficient and responsive to taxpayers’ concerns,
translated into efforts by European governments to align institutions of
higher learning with the priorities of social and economic development.
Market-oriented policies were seen as the formal structures and rational
means for reform (Bok, 2009). European governments have opted to
grant HEIs more autonomy in return for greater efficiency and ac-
countability.
The ideological grounding of the “rationalized myth” embedded in
the new policy template was found in the principles of New Public
Management, in which market-oriented management is seen as a means
to increase public sector efficiency. Market-oriented trends in public
management were set against what scholars refer to as the emergence of
a new “regulatory state,” which in Europe represented a fundamental
change from state-bureaucratic ‘welfareism’ (King, 2007). Greater in-
stitutional autonomy is combined with competitive funding mechan-
isms and performance measurement (Gornitzka et al., 2007; Maassen
and Olsen, 2007; Trakman, 2008). The new, post-bureaucratic forms of
governance retain diverse conceptions of the mission of higher educa-
tion, and have their roots in diverse institutional traditions. Never-
theless, there are common features that allow for the recognition of the
new model as a “common policy template” (Capano and Regini, 2014).
These features include:
the separation of operations from policy-making within government
departments, the construction of a formal distinction between pur-
chasers (government) and providers (market), and the establishment
of independent agencies at arm’s length from ministers to retain
influence over the market on behalf of the public interest (King,
2007, p. 413).
Some scholars have used the term “New Managerialism” (Braun and
Merrien, 1999) as description of a model with redefined links between
universities, markets and the state. The new blueprint is perhaps more
accurately typified as a post-bureaucratic hybrid of market and state
coordination, in which the state acts as an arbiter for the market
(Gornitzka and Maassen, 2000). Authors of a cross-country study of
governance trends concluded that in the new framework, “It is as if the
governments want to make sure that the universities and colleges use
the larger autonomy in such a way that the outcomes the governments
expect of enlarging the autonomy are indeed achieved.” (Gornitzka and
Maassen, 2000, p. 284).
The “common policy template” (Capano and Regini, 2014, p. 73)
was reinforced and legitimated by the European Union through its
Lisbon Agenda, launched in 2000 with a strong focus on knowledge as
the European economic engine. Policies such as concentrating power in
fewer hands, strengthening HEIs’ ties to the socioeconomic environ-
ment, and funding based on performance became an authoritative
blueprint for reform. Since then, European higher education systems
have become increasingly similar – a phenomenon studied and theo-
rized extensively by political scientists (theory of convergence – see e.g.
Heinze and Knill, 2008; Dobbins and Knill, 2009; Dobbins, 2011;
Dobbins (2017)) and organizational sociologists of the neo-in-
stitutionalist school (institutional isomorphism – see e.g. Zha, 2009; or
world systems – see e.g. Schriewer, 2009). Convergence in higher
education is an aspect of larger processes of global isomorphism and
standardization in education (Schriewer, 2009).
4. Polish reforms of science and higher education
The Western European shift towards “common policy template” was
a significant feature of the policy context of Polish higher education.
Marek Kwiek, a leading higher education scholar in Poland, notes that
for the first time since 1989,
“the state is becoming a stakeholder with its own, distinct say in
higher education. And for the first time, a say of the state as a sta-
keholder is different from a say of (the part of) the academic com-
munity” (Kwiek, 2012, p. 167)
The ground-breaking reforms of science and higher education
passed in 2009–2011 during the tenure of Barbara Kudrycka as Minister
of Science and Higher Education, as well as the more recent “Law 2.0”
discussed further in the paper, share a great many features consistent
with the European template. The reforms passed in 2010/2011 assumed
two primary goals: 1) intensified creation of new knowledge, oper-
ationalized with quantitative indicators as high-impact publication, and
2) high quality education, operationalized through a National
Qualifications Framework (NQF) – an integrated referencing system for
qualifications that uses learning outcomes as a major point of reference
across all educational sectors. The NQF was based on the European
Qualifications Framework (EQF) – an EU-wide initiative to make qua-
lifications more readable and transferable across member countries.
In the realm of science, policy-making was separated from the op-
erations of funding science by creating two independent funding
agencies for basic and applied research – National Science Centre
(Narodowe Centrum Nauki) and the National Centre for Research and
Development (Narodowe Centrum Badań i Rozwoju). The statutory re-
search subsidy was all but eliminated, and the agencies now disburse
funds exclusively on a competitive basis. The reform also created an
advisory body, Committee for the Evaluation of Scientific Units
(Komisja Ewaluacji Jednostek Naukowych), that compiles annual rank-
ings based on research performance, with financial support from the
state depending on the grade received – a mechanism maintained and
strengthened in the next wave of reforms passed in 2018. Since the first
wave of reforms, academic units1 have been evaluated using externally
defined indicators, with criteria weighed towards faculty publication in
English-language journals with impact factor ratings (Kulczycki, 2017).
In the realm of higher education, HEIs are mandated to follow the
National Qualifications Framework and to meet standards of evalua-
tion, while their autonomy to design programs of study was increased.
In 2010/2011, the powers of the central university administration were
expanded to include the creation, reorganization and closing of aca-
demic units. The reform also gave universities two options for gov-
ernance selection, allowing them to choose between the current tradi-
tional model and what it calls a “managerial” model. In the managerial
model, the rector was to be selected in an open search and then had the
freedom to conduct open searches for deans and vice-rectors (except the
vice-rector for academic affairs, the equivalent of the Provost in the U.S.
system), and make his own selections. The reform also maintained the
requirement set in place in the 1997 Law on Vocational Higher
Education that Boards of Trustees (Konwent) exist at Vocational Higher
Education Institutions (Wyższe Szkoły Zawodowe); other institutions
were encouraged but not required to appoint such boards (Poland,
2010).
A comprehensive reform passed in 2018 under Minister Jaroslaw
Gowin went a step further in pursuing the logic of more autonomy in
return for greater accountability to public interest in social and
1 The 2010 law on the financing of science defined an academic unit as an
institution continuously conducting research and/or development, which in-
cludes basic organizational units of HEIs as specified by their statutes, units of
the Polish Academy of Sciences, research institutes, the Polish Academy of
Skills, and other legally registered research organizations.
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economic development, as defined by the state. The Committee for the
Evaluation of Scientific Units was renamed the Committee for the
Evaluation of Science (Komisja Ewaluacji Nauki), and it is now to eval-
uate research in a given discipline rather than in a specific academic
unit of a university – yet it is still on the basis of externally defined
indicators favoring internationally visible publications (Poland, 2018).
Two of the most significant changes take the system further in the di-
rection of the “common European policy template.” The new law ex-
pands the powers of the rector to include setting the organizational
framework determining the institution’s structure (previously a pre-
rogative of collegial bodies), and – most controversially – introduces
mandatory Boards of Trustees at all public HEIs. The composition of
these boards was contested – the initial project assumed the majority of
the Board should come from outside the institution, but after protests
from the academic community, it was changed in its final form to re-
quire external representation to constitute at least 50% of the Board.
The functions of the Board in the law are also less extensive than in the
initial project – the Board is to give opinions on the institution’s statute,
strategy, and reports on the implementation of the strategy; to monitor
finances and management, and propose candidates for the post of
Rector upon their evaluation by the Senate.
What has remained unknown to date is how reforms moving the
system in the direction of an instrumental vision of the university in-
tersected with the patterns of identity at different types of institutions,
ranging from a flagship research university to a higher vocational
school. Did they occasion a conflict of “fundamental values,” as hy-
pothesized by Kwiek (2015, p. 87)? Were pressures to improve external
relevance seen as consistent or inconsistent with the different identity
patterns of different types of institutions? Is there evidence for change
in any of the organizational identity patterns as a result of reform? This
research, conducted between the two waves of reforms, is an attempt to
answer these questions.
5. Methods and design
The investigation employed a qualitative methodology to explore
the ideas of policymakers on the one hand, and academic leaders on the
other.
The author interviewed two groups of respondents: 1) Twelve ar-
chitects of the 2011–2012 reforms and experts involved in the legisla-
tive process that led to its passage; 2) Twenty academic leaders of four
public HEIs, representing the four main institutional types.
A.) Flagship HEI: one of only two HEIs in Poland ranked in the top 400
universities in the world, considered one of Poland’s two flagship
universities.
B.) Technical HEI: one of the 31 public universities of technology
(politechniki) in Poland, with long-standing traditions of co-
operating with industry.
C.) Specialized HEI: one of the so-called uniwersytety przymiotnikowe
– universities that grew out of specialized institutions, established
or re-organized after 1946.
D.) Vocational HEI: one of 36 State Higher Vocational Schools, the
youngest type of public HEI in Poland, established since 1997.
At each HEI, interviews were conducted with the rector, one vice-
rector or former rector, one senior administrator, two members of a
governance body, and one informal leader – since, as the work of
Sztompka (1993) and others indicates that in a post-communist social
system, those with the greatest power are often not those who occupy
powerful positions. The composition of both samples is summarized
below (Tables 1 and 2).
The primary method employed in this study was the elite interview,
and to ensure the validity of the data in the Polish context, the inter-
views took place during the researcher’s extended stay in the country.
The researcher became immersed in the social world of study partici-
pants for one year (2013–2014), using the opportunity of a visiting
appointment with an academic unit that trains leaders and managers
for the public sector, including higher education. Personal connections
through colleagues in the unit brought with them invitations to aca-
demic functions and closed events sponsored by organizations such as
the Foundation of Polish Rectors and the Conference of Rectors of
Academic Schools. Thus, the researcher was either known to re-
spondents prior to the interview, or received recommendation by a
member of a common private network – a rare feature in research
usually conducted in the region. It has been demonstrated that in post-
communist societies, people commonly experience a “split in social
consciousness” (Sztompka, 1993, p. 246) along the public-private di-
vide, with communication styles differing considerably depending on
whether the interlocutor is perceived as a member of the public or
private sphere. The researcher’s positionality as an outsider connected
to private networks and mastery of the Polish language bolstered the
validity of the findings in ways rarely achievable in similar studies in
the region.
Interviews were conducted, transcribed and analyzed for recurring
themes in the original language. Content analysis was conducted in
MAXQDA to compare the two groups for markers of identity oper-
ationalized as “rationalized myths” of the university. The first wave of
coding employed Clark’s (1986) classic triangle of coordination as the
initial source of coding categories (Shaw, 2018); however, in-vivo codes
emerging from language used by the participants themselves suggested
a coding structure built upon the distinction between institutional and
instrumental logics. The detailed operationalization of the two “ratio-
nalized myths” in the analysis of the interviews is presented in Ap-
pendix A. Interview segments were coded for the “rationalized myth”
they approximated, and for the evaluative stance of the speaker, so that
both positive statements and criticisms could be analyzed.
In consistency with a theoretical framework employing systems
Table 1
Government Sample Composition (n=12).
Ministry of Science and Higher Education Reform architects External experts Political advocates
Participants 3 3 2 4
Table 2
HEI Sample Composition (n=20).
President, Vice-President or former President Senior Administrator Member of Governance Body Informal Leader
Flagship 2 1 2 1
Technology 1 2 2 1
Specialized 1 1 2 1
Vocational 0 1 1 1
Total 4 5 7 4
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theory, this study was rooted in an interpretive approach, assuming that
people ascribe different meanings to the world around them, and the
meanings they construct constitute an essential element of social reality
(Menzel, 1978; Schwandt, 2000). Regardless of their ontological or
epistemological merit, subjects’ meanings and interpretations have a
real impact on the world they inhabit – or as Thomas and Znaniecki
(1927) noted, “if men perceive situations as real, they are real in their
consequences" (p. 81). The researcher’s aim was to observe and inter-
pret reality in terms of what it means to the people included in the
study, with the goal of producing a representation the subjects them-
selves would recognize (Geertz, 1973).
6. A conflict of rationalized myths: instrumental vs. institutional
visions of the university
The findings of this study lend credence to Kwiek’s (2015) hy-
pothesis as to the existence of a conflict of values between policy actors
and academic leaders regarding the aims of the university and its
proper relations with the state.2
Policymakers unequivocally assume the “desirable end” of higher
education is the development of the economy and society through the
“rational means” (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 345) of fair competition,
embracing a clearly instrumental logic (Fig. B1 in Appendix B). The
desirable ends and rational means assumed by academic leaders are less
uniform, yet to the majority of respondents in this group, the university
is primarily an institution engaging in the disinterested pursuit of truth
by means of mutual, trust-based accountability (Fig. B2 in Appendix B).
The strength of this pattern of identity was greatest at Flagship and
Specialized universities, followed closely by Vocational HEI; the only
institutional type where the reforms were not seen as perturbations to
the proper mission of the university was Technical University. A visual
representation of both positive and negative statements by respondents
is available in Appendix B.
Significantly, both groups perceived cracks in their “rational means”
that threaten the attainment of the respective “desirable ends.” As
further, the existence of these cracks results from a problematic inter-
section of the two “rationalized myths.” Using the language of systems
theory, compensations aimed at restoring the system’s ability to self-
perpetuate threaten the realization of its native pattern of identity
without delivering the outcomes desired by their source.
Detailed findings follow in the subsequent two sections, with the
majority of the discussion devoted to the academic sample.
6.1. Instrumental Myth: “if the state pays for something, it expects specific
results”
Polish policymakers clearly embrace the instrumental view of the
higher education sector as a tool of state policy to achieve economic
growth and social development through mechanisms of fair competi-
tion. Competition was a word used 41 times in the 12 interviews with
policy actors, compared with 13 times in the 21 academic leader in-
terviews.
In the views of these respondents, higher education is too important
to be left to the whims of a very imperfect educational market. Multiple
respondents noted that a truly free market is not possible unless “con-
sumers” are the ones paying for a “service” and assessing its value – and
most students at public universities in Poland do not pay for their
education. In an imperfect market, where it is the state that pays for
public higher education, it is also the state that takes up the role of
advocate to the consumer:
…if the state pays for something, it expects specific results. (108:34)
In the non-ideal situation in which the majority of public university
funding comes directly from the state, it is up to the state to make sure
public money is being spent well; and what “well” means is determined
by the state.
According to respondents in the policymaking community, it is up to
the state to evaluate the outputs of higher education and to incentivize
those perceived as strategic for national development. In a manner re-
flective of the instrumental logic and the European policy template, pol-
icymakers thought that the state must skew the educational market in favor
of those who will provide the best services with the greatest public benefit.
Not one person among those interviewed believed “the invisible hand of
the market” would ensure the best private or public returns, at least not in
the current legal, economic and cultural environment. It is presently too
easy to deceive potential students, the costs to the public are too high, and
the effects take too long to be seen. Without some control from the state,
too many people would want bogus degrees, and too many universities
would be willing to provide them. The educational market is also too ob-
scure and too imperfect to allow for truly informed choice, so the state that
pays for so much of public higher education must also act as the arbiter of
what kind of education serves public interest. The view of the state as an
ally and protector of public good in higher education is illustrated well in
the following excerpt:
The way I see it, progressive forces in higher education should no-
tice incentives from the state, and if they are intelligent, they will
see the state as their ally. (108:38)
While policymakers shared the view of the state as the one who
establishes the playing field, who pays and demands – they differed in
their ideas about the extent of what the state can and should demand.
Some thought that the government should merely provide fair rules,
create transparent systems of information, and allow the market to do
the rest. The market, for example, should play a key role in evaluating
the preparation of graduates, even those at the doctoral level:
I like what you have in the States, that a young person graduates or
gets a doctorate, and it’s the external world that evaluates him.
(110:40)
Others favored a more robust state involvement in controlling the
educational process, especially as far as setting benchmarks for quality
and preventing pathologies.
What does it look like in practice for the state to act as an arbiter of
public interest? In the absence of better benchmarks, the state has at-
tempted to do this by requiring minimal levels of education for aca-
demic staff in state-accredited programs. Undergraduate study pro-
grams were mandated to employ at least three academic staff with the
Doctor Habilitatus (Doktor Habilitowany) degree, and at least six with
doctorates in the required academic field. In practical fields, up to one
Doctor Habilitatus could be replaced by two Doctors, and up to two
Doctors could be replaced by two faculty with Master’s degree in that
field.3 Each academic staff could only be counted towards the minimum
requirement at one institution. While recognized as imperfect, this
mechanism was cited as an example of the state protecting the interests
of the public – a claim disputed by academic leaders cited in the fol-
lowing section.
Full-time employees of the Ministry unaffiliated with other institu-
tions spoke most distinctly about the role of the state being merely
supervisory, limited to financing and accreditation. They claimed that
in the system of higher education as a whole, they hold much less in-
fluence than the academic community itself:
2 Since this study is not representative of all Polish academic institutions,
when speaking in the following section of “policy actors” and “academic lea-
ders”, it should be clear that the author is referring to the respondents in this
study.
3 The law provided exceptions to this rule in select disciplines that have been
in existence for some time and were able to make a case for differential treat-
ment.
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The role of the ministry is limited to supervision, just supervision.
Control of the fulfillment of their tasks. So the ball is 100% in the
HEIs’ court. (106:34, emphasis added)
As noted further, however, a merely supervisory role of the Ministry
appears to be an aspirational ideal. Policymakers clearly believe they
should play a very limited role, but the role they actually play is quite
substantial. It has been noted that during the tenure of Barbara
Kudrycka (2007–2013), whose senior employees were interviewed for
this study, the role of the Ministry in steering higher education became
more assertive than at any point since the post-socialist transition
(Kwiek, 2012). To mention just a few examples, the Ministry plays an
assertive role in determining the criteria for the research subsidy and
for state accreditation, setting strategic funding priorities for programs
deemed crucial for national development, and selecting members in all
major bodies such as the Committee for the Evaluation of Academic
Units, the Polish Accreditation Commission, and the Main Council for
Higher Education. Therefore, the ball being in HEIs court can either be
interpreted either as an aspirational ideal, or as a defense of the in-
creasing exercise of state muscle in higher education.
Nevertheless, the reforms of 2010–2011 certainly did aim, at least in
theory, to give HEIs the freedom to shape their research agendas and
study programs, with indirect control at the level of evaluating the
quality of internal evaluation measures and final outputs:
Institutions have received more autonomy… They have more
freedom, they have more scope in their affairs, and a different me-
chanism was set up, namely external quality assurance, which only
becomes necessary in this context where you don’t have this direct
control. However, it is exactly in this context that some kind of
external oversight and involvement of society at large makes sense.
So basically the two sides of the coin being autonomy and ac-
countability. (107:13)
The trend to increase accountability and incentivize externally de-
fined quality is most evident in how the Polish government evaluates
and funds research. It was summarized bluntly by a member of the
Committee for the Evaluation of Academic Units who said:
Do as you please. Yet it’s not quite do as you please – do as you
please and at the end of the year come show me your points.
(102:131)
The “points” mentioned by the respondent refer to a national system
for the evaluation of academic units. The reforms of 2010–2011 in-
troduced a ranking of departments and centers by the scientific output
of their employees. Using parametric criteria such as the Impact Factor,
the Committee for the Evaluation of Scientific Units assigned each unit
one of four categories, determining the amount of a statutory research
subsidy received by that unit for the following four years. The evalua-
tion was based on a point-based ranking of scientific publications an-
nounced annually by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education.4
The logic of the mechanism is to incentivize deans and other unit di-
rectors to recruit and retain highly productive academic staff whose
achievements will translate into increased funds (108). Since all other
funding for research in Poland is disbursed on a competitive basis by
independent agencies that also use the ministerial ranking as a guide-
line,5 nearly all research funds are supposed to be distributed according
to externally defined and performance-based criteria. This represents a
radical departure from past practices, when statutory research funds
were not tied to performance, and became distributed through aca-
demic hierarchies. In the view of most of the policymakers, steering
through objective performance-based criteria eliminates cronyism in
the distribution of taxpayers’ investment and sets the system of higher
education and science on course towards greater public benefit.
Among respondents from the policy arena, there was one significant
voice of dissent with regard to the merits of performance-based criteria.
A respected academic affiliated with one of the country’s top uni-
versities who served for a term at the Ministry of Science and Higher
Education saw the logic of setting goals and demanding results as
detrimental to genuine creativity and development:
Autonomy of HEIs is a guarantor of the academic freedom of
thought, of creativity. If you just give a task and finance it and hold
people accountable to it, you put a hamper on development.
(103:52)
In this view, the university is a forge of new ideas foundational for
the process of innovation, and many such ideas would not appear if
everything was measured and accounted for. Instrumental and institu-
tional roles of higher education go hand in hand, and recent reforms go
too far in attempting to measure the unmeasurable.
Over all, policymakers spoke of three ways in which the state is
attempting to incentivize desired outcomes in the provision of higher
education.
i Mandating the inclusion of student evaluations of teaching in
mandatory evaluations of academic staff;
ii Mandating universities to collect tracking data on their graduates,
and from 2015 – publishing longitudinal data on graduates ‘earnings
based on the national higher education database combined with
anonymized data from the Social Security Administration (Polish
Graduate Tracking System, 2018);
iii Implementing the Polish Qualifications Framework (PQF), based of
the European Qualifications Framework – consisting of eight qua-
lification levels, with learning outcomes described in the three ca-
tegories of knowledge, skills and social competence.
Since the reforms in 2010–2011, in order to be accredited, higher
education programs must formulate their curricula in terms of learning
outcomes described in the Framework (Educational Research Institute,
2013). In the past, the Ministry had maintained a set list of 118 study
programs and their required components. Now HEIs have greater au-
tonomy in shaping their study programs as they please, provided that
the learning outcomes align with the PQF. In the accreditation process,
the Polish Accreditation Commission verifies whether the validation of
learning outcomes is consistent with programs’ stated aims. As becomes
evident in the next section, all three mechanisms are seen as quite
problematic by academic leaders, and the root of the opposition goes
back to a fundamental disagreement about the nature of the university.
In summary, the state’s instrumental view of higher education evi-
dent in the interviews as well as actual policies implies incentivizing
outcomes perceived as strategic – whether by increasing competition in
research, making sure HEIs evaluate what they say they want to ac-
complish, or by providing the public with reliable information on their
outcomes. Cracks in this view tend to be visible to those immersed in
the organizational setting of a traditional flagship university. This
“rationalized myth” is problematized by the realities of an imperfect
educational market and a perceived need for the state to mandate and
legislate more than what would be considered ideal by respondents.
6.2. Institutional Myth: “protected from the rationality of the market”
For the majority academic leaders included in this study, higher
education is not primarily an instrument of development, but an
4 The ranking consists of three parts: A) Journals that have an assigned Impact
Factor in the Thomson Reuters Journal Citation Reports (JCR) (15-50 points);
B) Journals that do not have an Impact Factor (1-10 points), and C) the
European Reference for the Humanities (10-14 points).
5 Basic research is funded by Narodowe Centrum Nauki (National Science
Centre - NCN); while applied research is funded by a separate agency,
Narodowe Centrum Badań i Rozwoju (National Centre for Research and
Development – NCBiR).
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institution engaging in the disinterested pursuit of truth and the for-
mation of broadly educated citizens. In the context of a knowledge-
based economy, the benefits it provides for individuals and economies
are seen as significant and taken very seriously by the respondents – yet
those are mere side effects of a more essential mission of higher edu-
cation. A professor who had spent years training university executives
summarized this notion when he said:
The university has two tasks; on the one hand, to hold up tradition,
which is the identity of a given community, and on the other hand,
to speak out against that which is harmful to this community… The
role of the university is to proclaim truth and speak against
error. This is the best definition of the university mission. (206:28;
emphasis added)
Another respondent said:
The whole concept of the university is about disinterestedness.
If the university is subjected either to business or to politics, then it
is just a service provider. (217:43; emphasis added)
The aim of higher education is to push the boundaries of knowledge
and to provide students with a holistic education, in which employment
skills are not the main focus. Such sentiments were expressed most
forcefully at Flagship University.
Ideals of pursuing and teaching truth were seen by many as being
undermined by the recent policy shifts aiming to make higher education
an engine of economic growth. The notable exception was the
University of Technology, where complaints regarding the govern-
ment’s policies had more to do with the tightening grip of bureaucracy
associated with increased accountability for outcomes – a concern ex-
pressed by policymakers as well. At the same time, the goal of aligning
higher education and science with the market was seen as positive –
interestingly, not so at Vocational HEI, established for the purpose of
practical training. The University of Technology was the only HEI at
which the goals of pursuing truth and providing high returns to higher
education were seen as complementary.
At all institutional types, less respect was accorded to practical
training programs that prepare graduates for specific jobs. The richest
and most heated discussion surrounding HEIs’ mission centered on a
widespread sentiment that the aim of a HEI is to give students a broad
education, not narrow job training. Leaders of Flagship University and
Specialized University in particular expressed strong opposition to the
idea that the role of the university is just to provide targeted training for
the workforce:
If the employer complains that we do not have a study program that
will prepare his employee for a specific workplace, we just don't
have that. That's not what universities are for. (201:38, emphasis
added)
Arguments to the same effect are often heard in the Polish media,
most famously in the inaugural speech by the new rector of Warsaw
University in October 2013. The youngest rector in recent history said:
The university is not a company, and accounting is not the queen of
the sciences. HEIs are not responsible for the condition of the Polish
economy… I have no doubts that various vocational schools are
necessary. Ignoring technical knowledge would be a mistake, but we
are pouring out the baby with the bath water. Why should practical
qualifications be Poland’s trademark? Will welders solve the current
social and economic problems of the country? Will Polish seams-
tresses beat those from Bangladesh? (Gazeta Wyborcza, 2013-10-
01).
The view of the university as a temple of knowledge was most
pronounced at Flagship HEI and Specialized HEI, where such a view
coincided with an overwhelmingly negative assessment of the massifi-
cation of the higher education system. Yet not only here but at all four
types of institutions academic leaders wished for the return of the days
when there were few students, small seminars, and opportunities
building a master-student relationship. They recognized that not all
HEIs need to be universities in the traditional sense, but none of them
wanted to be anything else. Much like the rector of Warsaw University,
they claimed various vocational schools are necessary – as long as it is
someone else playing that role, not their institution.
The majority of academic leaders, with the notable exception of
Technical University, described the realities of massification and man-
dates to make education practically relevant in terms suggesting that
they were undesirable perturbations contrary to HEIs ‘proper mission.
Interestingly, such sentiments also prevailed at Specialized and
Vocational HEI – institutions whose official mission statements refer to
the development of practical competencies. Representatives of both of
these institutions stated that if they could, they would eliminate the
adjectives attached to their names and assume the same status as
“normal,” traditional universities. Respondents at Flagship University
complained of the devaluing of the term “university. “Interestingly, the
same criticism was reiterated at Specialized University, which itself
called itself a “university “only within the last twenty years.
The resilience of the organizational pattern built around the agenda
of pursuing knowledge and providing a liberal education appears to be
fueled by two principal dynamics. First, the majority of HEIs were built
on the organizational blueprint of traditional universities, which is also
where they drew from for their staff:
If you look at the staff of practical HEIs, let's say the State Vocational
HEIs and private HEIs, their staff came from large public uni-
versities… These HEIs usually do not have the rights to grant Ph.D.
or Habilitatus degrees, or at the most they have the rights to grant
Ph.D.s in a few disciplines. So the staff comes from universities and
grows up within their patterns. (213:46)
The identity of the university as a self-governing community in
search of truth is not a matter of culture alone. Reforms to the system of
higher education since the 1990s were designed by experts from tra-
ditional universities, who entrenched their logic in legislation and
funding policies that apply equally to a flagship university and a vo-
cational institution. Even in the 2011 reform, greater autonomy to open
new educational programs without ministry approval was granted only
to institutions and units with the right to grant Habilitatus degrees. The
funding formula also continues to favor HEIs with academic profiles:
There is power in granting academic degrees and titles… It gives
greater autonomy, and higher subsidies for teaching. The prestige is
higher because we can educate our own staff, and staff for others. It
matters in rankings and financing algorithms. (218:56)
While critical of the government’s efforts, academic leaders re-
cognized and accepted that to realize their goals in the present age,
HEIs must play by the rules of the market. The market is where the
resources are, so it has to be reckoned with – but everywhere except the
University of Technology, it was seen as a reality that must be lived
with and even exploited for one’s own ends; but not given in to as far as
mission is concerned.
As a result of market forces, applied research, which used to be held
in contempt, is now more respected for the money it brings in, espe-
cially at the University of Technology:
No applied science, until recently these things were treated as a
worse kind of science. It's not that way anymore. (207:31)
Yet even at this university, which has the strongest links to industry,
some disagreed on the ultimate value of applied research:
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What is most highly valued is bringing in grants, large grants from
industry, which can certainly be of benefit to the country. But is this
beneficial for furthering knowledge? I don't think so. (214:9)
Even at this institution, grants for basic science from the National
Science Center were seen as more prestigious than the applied grants
from the National Center for Research and Development.
What academic leaders from all institutional types had in common
was a view that the striving of the Ministry to steer HEIs towards
greater socioeconomic relevance by means of mandates and output
measures is achieving the opposite of what was intended – these “ra-
tional” means are not achieving the results desired by the Ministry. The
critique of the government’s current approach was summarized by a
dean at Flagship University, who said:
An economy should be innovative, but I don't know if you can
impose the obligation to innovate from above, with a decree of
the dean, the rector, or the minister. (224:19, emphasis added)
The sentiment was echoed to various degrees at all types of in-
stitutions that in its efforts to mandate productivity, the government
has stripped HEIs of the freedom they would need to innovate in gen-
uine ways – a concern shared by policymakers. Academics are free to
research what they want, provided that they can obtain funds from
institutions that disburse them according to what is deemed strategic to
the country. They can teach what they want, as long as it aligns with the
PQF. While recent laws may represent an ideological shift towards
greater autonomy and accountability, the full body of regulations pre-
vents the greater autonomy from becoming a felt reality.
Four respondents described the law using the same word – a
“corset” (210, 213, 214, 217). The feeling of being bound was espe-
cially common among deans and those at the middle level of HEI
governance structures:
I am in a corset of regulations. I can’t do anything. (217:51)
Leaders of academic units, with the notable exception of Technical
HEI, said they are hemmed in by the law and too overwhelmed by the
burdens of bureaucracy to lead in a strategic or competent way.
Respondents provided telling examples of how their ability to design
marketable study programs in accordance with the Polish
Qualifications Framework is restricted by requirements set out by the
law to protect educational quality as operationalized by the state.
For example, at Vocational HEI, legal restrictions prevented the
opening of publically subsidized programs in Information Technology,
Materials Engineering and Agrotourism – fields that represent growing
sectors of the economy. The application to open a program in
Information Technology was denied because too many of the Ph.D.
holders listed for the minimum staffing requirement received their
degrees in disciplines other than computer science. An administrator at
Vocational HEI explained that holders of doctoral degrees in
Information Technology are very hard to find because their demand
exceeds supply, and they are able to make three or four times more
outside academia. The same problem was confirmed by a dean in the
hard sciences at Technical University, who said he had seven unfilled
positions at the time of the interview for which he could not find
candidates (216). In the case of Vocational HEI, if the law was not as
restrictive, it would have been possible to fill open positions with
holders of Master’s degrees, and such instructors would have been
preferred. As a few respondents noted, holders of advanced degrees
trained at public research universities transplant their preference for
theory over practice to HEIs that exist to train students in practical
fields (213:46). Yet for the sake of meeting the minimum staffing re-
quirement, the administrators at Vocational HEI had to resort to finding
Ph.D. holders in other disciplines who used information technology,
such as Quantum Physics – and still, their application was denied (220).
Vocational HEI was also denied applications to open programs in
Materials Engineering and Agrotourism. The reason was that they did
not have the proper laboratories and infrastructure on campus, al-
though they had signed agreements with commercial firms and a
partnering university to make such infrastructure available until the
HEI can develop its own. The reason for the denial was a legal provision
that requires HEIs to demonstrate that they have the necessary class-
room space and equipment on campus (221). At present, Vocational
HEI offers degrees in academic fields, such as political science, phi-
lology, management, and pedagogy. In conclusion, one administrator
said bluntly, “we are aware that we are producing unemployed people
“(221:32). Leaders of this university realize that what they offer to
students is inconsistent with what they say in their mission statement,
or with what the students come for – but they feel they do not have the
agency to change it.
Representatives of the government had explained the increasing
regulation results from three imperatives: 1) Eliminating pathologies;
2) Fulfilling the duties of European harmonization; and 3) Promoting
high quality of teaching and research. The official who listed these
imperatives also admitted that with the exception of the new grant
funding mechanisms, the policy instruments are almost exclusively
mandates:
I would say it was a repressive approach – too much moonlighting,
so let’s forbid moonlighting. Too much nepotism, so let’s forbid
nepotism… (108:6)
According to academic leaders, the result is that the measures in-
tended to eliminate pathologies often produce further pathologies (217,
222). For example, since it is no longer legal to have two full-time jobs,
and academic positions still pay below the national mean, academics
take on independent contracts that give them less money than before,
engendering the necessity to take on even more jobs to stay in the
middle class. Tightening restrictions in the areas of public finance,
many of which get interpreted differently by different officials, dis-
courage academic leaders from applying for external funds in fear of
audit and looming penalties for non-compliance. The legal “corset”
meant to protect quality makes both officials and academic leaders
inflexible, fueling their reluctance to act in entrepreneurial ways. Even
those academics who affirmed the ideas behind the regulations thought
that their intended aims were being degenerated by fear:
The idea of the system in Poland is good, but out of fear, officials
demand more than necessary. The same goes for applications to the
European Union – the criteria are milder there, and here they are
made harsher out of fear. (219:21)
In the view of academic leaders, HEIs are no longer autonomous
communities of scholars, or if they are, they remain so by acting on the
edge of the law. At the same time, HEIs are also not the instruments of
national development envisioned by the government. They are some-
thing in between, and their uncertain position achieves neither of the
two visions.
Academic deans in particular noted that even though the govern-
ment claims it wants to evaluate outcomes, they in fact do not trust
universities and therefore control minute elements of the educational
and research processes, leaving little room for strategic leadership at
the level of individual HEIs. One particular statement by a dean at the
University of Technology stands out as a stark judgment of the emer-
ging system, all the more striking because it was uttered by someone
who sympathized with the reformers’ aims more than most re-
spondents:
It is just like during communism. The constitution said that
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everyone is free, there is freedom of association, freedom of speech,
except it must be regulated. We also have full autonomy, but it must
be regulated. The number of regulations sent non stop to HEIs is
such as we did not absolutely have under the previous regime…
On the one hand, the state claims that they give us complete au-
tonomy, but it is just an appearance. They give us autonomy when
it comes to the content, but not when it comes to the form – but
the form determines what you can put in it. (214:61-62, em-
phasis added)
If academic leaders see freedom as a critical condition for the proper
functioning of higher education, and criticize the government so
heavily for its regulatory efforts, what is their view of the proper form
of accountability? Contrary to what the government officials may think,
what is central to the mission of the university cannot be measured:
a university cannot be made into a firm because apart from its
commercial tasks, it has one overarching task - to educate people
in a way that cannot be measured. (219:59)
The mechanisms of evaluation and accountability of which aca-
demic leaders spoke favorably are informal and unwritten, allowing for
flexibility and enabling free pursuit of knowledge in community with
students. The notion of a quantifiable measure of quality in the edu-
cation of students was seen as particularly utopian - an insight actually
shared by policymakers. While a few may have dreamed of including
the employment rates of graduates in the funding algorithm (104, 108,
110, 111), nobody thought this would be viable – because it would
obscure the educational value added and penalize HEIs that target
underprepared students. Since the quality of teaching is not as easily
reducible to quantitative indicators as the quality of research, it is
controlled and regulated on paper – but not rewarded in real life.
To the academic leaders included in this study, the ideal form of
accountability is a matter of organizational culture, not an Excel
spreadsheet of standardized points. The only kind of accountability that
does not stifle creativity is one where academics evaluate each other on
an individualized basis. This kind of evaluation continues to function
despite the efforts of the government of objectify and standardize it:
There must be a system of verification, and it actually does exist in
the academic community as in every community – the hierarchy is
known of who is good and who is worse. It is unwritten and these
points don’t change it. (219:33)
Evaluation of creative academic endeavors, in teaching as well as
research, is too complex to be reduced to a set of externally defined
indicators. An example brought up in a variety of contexts was that of
Immanuel Kant – one of the most significant figures in Western philo-
sophy who would have been fired by the current point-based criteria,
since he produced only one small book in ten years. A good system of
academic accountability is one that supports people like Kant instead of
eliminating them for the sake of meeting performance standards.
While there was apparent agreement that the ideal is mutual ac-
countability of academics accompanied by social trust, a minority of
respondents questioned whether this ideal could ever be realized in
Poland due to a deficit of trust (203, 205, 214, 217, 222). These voices
are unsurprising given the central role of trust in the idealized system
proposed in a country with one of the lowest levels of social trust in
Europe (European Social Survey, 2018). The dilemma was captured by
one person who said:
For science to function normally, you need trust. Trust is at a deficit
in Polish science. (222:16)
In five rich interviews, favorable discussions of the ideal of trust-
based accountability were accompanied by statements like, “of course,
it’s a utopia” (217), “it's a type of academic culture that we won't ever
have here” (214), or “it’s practically impossible “(203). A few others
described what they would hope for universities to be, and then go on
to say why it will not work. The culture of Polish academia as painted
by these five respondents is one in which personal and institutional
goals are often achieved by evading formal rules and officially stated
processes. Having complained about increasing regulation and ex-
pressed nostalgia for trust-based accountability, some of the re-
spondents went on to say things such as this:
It is not working in Poland at all. That is my impression. But it is not
the government's fault, the culture is what is to blame. (214:11)
For twenty years after the transformation, the academic community
was governed by democratic principles, with freedom to set its own
priorities and to regulate itself. Due to mental and social habits that
preclude trust, attempts at trust-based accountability produced a
system of rewards that actually rewarded those who performed less
well. Given the abuses of trust-based accountability, it is no wonder to
some respondents that the Ministry took a more decisive stance. While
they may disagree with the solutions, their impetus is well-understood:
For twenty years the academic community has shown that it is not
able to govern itself, and it cannot set its own priorities… Although I
disagree with the Ministry, I understand them. If you are unable to
govern yourselves, you will have a hegemon. (222:11; emphasis
added)
Elements of the culture cited as contrary to the basic prerequisites of
trust-based accountability were described in the following way:
What we have here is in some sense an outcome of the mentality
that a Pole will finagle, a Pole will find a way around. Perhaps this
is a harsh judgment, and it is unfortunate… Poles are excellent at
going around various regulations, there are influential people with
the old mentality, and the new generation is similar. (219:25,57;
emphasis added)
The original word used by the respondent is the term” kombinować,”
which is best rendered as “to finagle” or “to game the system” and
connotes manipulating a situation in an attempt to achieve a goal.
Unlike the English translation, the Polish word is not pejorative – it
suggests finding a way around many obstacles, as illustrated in the
following excerpt:
What we have here is a constant finagling, I'm not saying it in a bad
sense, but finding a way around everything. (210:8; emphasis
added)
In the view of these respondents, “finagling” is a habit that flour-
ished during communism, faded into the background during two dec-
ades of self-governance, and was unfortunately reinforced once again
by an unrealistically overgrown law that cannot be followed without
contradiction. Academic leaders believed that the normal functioning
of their HEIs is only possible thanks to loopholes and inconsistencies.
This trapped people between options they do not ethically approve of –
as when they are required by law to hold an open competition for a post
expected by a valued doctoral student who has no chance of being
considered elsewhere due to nearly all academic hires in Poland being
internal to the institution.
Respondents provided numerous examples of evasive behaviors that
enabled them to get things done despite laws perceived as restrictive,
unrealistic or unfair. For example, a person at Technical HEI who
oversaw its impressive rise in rankings and in financial prosperity, said
he was only able to lead the university as he did because of a “creative”
management of finances, which required making adjustments of du-
bious legality. A dean at Specialized HEI described how the unfair
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incentivization of English-language publications in the field of Polish
Philology could be evaded by means of a mutual publication deal with a
colleague just across the border in the Czech Republic to publish in each
other‘s journals what they would have published freely had the reg-
ulation not been in place. Examples of this kind were provided freely
and openly in about half of all interviews with academic leaders.
The trouble with “finagling”, even when it might be a reasonable
compensatory response to the invasion of the instrumental “rationa-
lized myth” implemented through overly bureaucratic means, is that it
furthers the erosion of trust – both between academics, and in their
relation to society. Trust, meanwhile, is at the core of the rationalized
myth embraced by academic leaders. Lack of trust translates into more
attempts for control, which generates more evasion, and the cycle
continues to run its course.
In summary, the logic embraced by the majority of academic leaders
is one of social trust in academics to hold up moral standards in pursuit
of service to truth, and hold one another accountable while protected
from the vagaries of the market – a “rationalized myth” problematized
by the realities of low social trust and widespread mechanisms to evade
regulation perceived as stifling.
7. Discussion
The findings of this study not only lend credence to Kwiek’s (2015)
hypothesis regarding a conflict of fundamental values between the
academic and policy-making communities in Poland, even at the cusp
of another round of reforms by a different political party, but driven by
the same instrumental myth. More fundamentally, looking through the
lens of second-order systems theory, they also paint a picture of a
system engaging in “compensations” to external “perturbation” that
compromise both the outcomes intended by the source of the pertur-
bation, and the system’s own pattern of self-production. In the face of
external pressure to produce “desirable ends” defined by the state, the
response of a community rooted in a different identity and loyal to a
different “rationalized myth” has been to appear compliant towards
new demands, but to preserve the fundamental habits characteristic of
the university as a disembedded institution.
The government’s self-admitted overreliance on bureaucratic man-
dates appears to be the outcome of an apt recognition of a different
pattern of identity, driving a different agenda than the one embraced by
the state, and precluding trust in common ends. Academics have had no
choice but to adapt to the changing mandates and incentives, but the
adaptations should occasion serious pause for the policy community.
When the law proscribes open competitions for academic posts, they
are announced so as to choose a candidate pre-selected by the academic
community according to its own criteria. When criteria for promotion
are tied to international publication, faculty arrange a publication deal
with colleagues in the Czech Republic. The unfortunate reality is that
such adaptive mechanisms undermine the social trust that is at the very
foundation of either the institutional or instrumental model of aca-
demic work. Even though cycles of perturbation and compensation look
to academics more like a return to the communist past than the way of a
brighter future, there was no other obvious way to live out the instru-
mental blueprint.
The roots of this predicament are perhaps best captured using a
metaphor. The Polish higher education system in the 1990s resembled
the situation of a farmer who needed to plow a field, but did not have a
horse. Not having what he needed, the farmer harnessed his dairy cow.
The dairy cow did the job, although the trauma from the harness had
adverse effects on her health and diminished the quality of her milk. As
the farmer‘s holdings grew and horses were still in short supply, he
decided to invest in more cows to plow his fields. Twenty years later,
there are horses in the market, but the farmer already has a herd of
cows who do not produce good milk because of their harness trauma,
but do well enough plowing the fields for the farmer to just barely stay
in business.
In the early days after the transformation, the government needed to
prepare a workforce for the market economy, but had few institutions
or teaching staff specialized in this type of task. What it did have access
to were existing universities and other HEIs. The organizational iden-
tities and institutional structures of most well-respected institutions
were primarily oriented towards an entirely different type of activity
than the preparation of a workforce for a market economy – the pursuit
of knowledge and the training of broadly educated citizens. The system
was rapidly expanded, with a growing number of institutions and
academic staff patterned and socialized according to an organizational
blueprint that corresponded with goals and myths other than those now
placed before both old and new institutions. Twenty years later, the
fields of market-relevant education remain crookedly plowed, and the
milk of new knowledge is hampered by trauma incurred in the harness
of the market. The exceptional case of Technical HEI reinforces the
point – the only institution in this study described by none of its leaders
as “sick “is one whose root identity is consistent with the myth em-
braced by the government, and the aim of serving the needs of the
economy. Going back to the farming metaphor, the horse that is
Technical HEI might suffer when the harness is too tight, but the har-
ness does not deny or restrict its fundamental identity.
In light of the findings of this study, what is the likely impact of Law
2.0, which takes the instrumental logic a step further, offering more
autonomy in return for greater accountability while ostensibly reducing
the regulatory “harness”? The cornerstone of the reform, which is re-
warding institutions that produce quantifiable knowledge shows some
promise of bridging the two visions of the university to a greater extent
than the previous reforms. Conducting high-quality research at the
forefront of existing knowledge lies at the core of what academics see as
their institutions’ identity, while also being valued from the standpoint
of potentially maximizing public returns. The new mechanism of eva-
luation focusing on selected achievements is already seen as an im-
provement upon the earlier pressures to produce as many publications
as possible, without regard for their intrinsic value to the researcher.
Whether the bridge between myths turns out to be viable will depend
on the way academic units interpret and operationalize the new criteria
for evaluation in passing them down to academic staff.
In addition, two institutions crucial for a promising bridge between
the two “rationalized myths “in the sphere of research are the agencies
for funding basic and applied science, the National Science Centre
(NCN) and the National Centre for Research and Development (NCBiR),
which have shown themselves as capable of winning greater legitimacy
than their predecessors. Their success in the wake of the recent reform
hinges on the perceived validity and transparency of the means em-
ployed for evaluating merit in grant proposals, and on the continued
commitment on the part of the government to disburse the majority of
future funding for scientific research by way of independent institutions
rather than through political channels.
Meanwhile, moves by the current government to assume control of
the judiciary, cultural institutions and public media have raised fears of
Law 2.0 being a veiled attempt to do the same to higher education. It
does not help build public trust that independent agencies disburse less
than half of the country’s research budget. For Law 2.0 to maintain
legitimacy in the eyes of the major stakeholders, the activities of the
two funding agencies would need be scaled up, keeping in mind the
findings of a UNESCO study that middle-income countries have tended
to benefit more from translational than from basic research (Schaaper,
2014).
As far as the aim of fostering marketable skills, the new law appears
to concede to the values of the academic community by continuing to
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uphold the greater prestige of academic programs and disciplines, and
channeling a powerful stream of funding towards traditional uni-
versities. This move appears problematic towards the goal of producing
employable graduates as these institutions appear in this study to be the
carriers of “DNA” divergent from what the state would wish to re-
produce. Yet long as the economy stays vibrant under the wide stream
of European Union funding, and graduates enter easily into an em-
ployee’s market, skills mastered at academic institutions will likely to
be perceived as sufficient to the current situation. Law 2.0 thus opens
up the opportunity for traditional universities to prove true to the claim
that critical thinking, “soft skills” and habits of lifelong learning matter
more in a 21st century economy than the possession of a specific skill
currently prioritized by employers. What the law does not do is in-
centivize these outcomes in any way, as institutions and thus individual
academics are to be evaluated on the basis of producing quantifiable
knowledge.
Finally, the impact of Law 2.0 is likely to be blurred by the mere the
pace of legislative change in Polish higher education in recent years,
which has produced a strong sense of “reform fatigue.” The academic
community has struggled to keep pace with the new regulations and
directives. Each successive reform effort deepened the perception that
the previous one was incomplete and underdeveloped, and that new
solutions were not allowed to ripen or bear fruit before being super-
seded by even newer mechanisms. Whether this perception is accurate
or not, the mere perception increases the likelihood that further reforms
of the existing system in the near future would be resented, evaded and
even subverted on the ground.
8. Conclusions
Social systems tend to generate the outcomes they were designed
for. According to the systems theorist Richard Buckminster Fuller, “You
never change things by fighting the existing reality. To change some-
thing, build a new model that makes the existing model obsolete”
(Fuller, 2019). The organizational “DNA” proscribing the self-genera-
tion of the university as a social institution in the service of truth re-
mains incredibly resilient (Lenartowicz, 2015) – a fact confirmed over
and over again in studies of academic staff. Tenets of disinterested truth
and academic self-governance have been the rallying cry of academics
in the Czech Republic (Pabian et al., 2011), Germany (Krücken, 2003;
Pritchard, 2004), Italy (Tavoletti, 2010), Austria (Pechar, 2012), and
Poland (Shaw, 2018). As Shaw & Lenartowicz (2016) have noted,
governments and reformers who attempt to forge a different identity for
European universities contend not only with a powerful tradition as-
sociated with Wilhelm von Humboldt, but also with decades of research
showing that reforms of higher education institutions in general have
been notoriously difficult to institute, and they usually fail (Hotho,
2013; Wildavsky et al., 2011; Psacharopoulos, 1989; Clark, 1986;
Levine, 1980). Maassen and Olsen (2007) posited that when reforms in
higher education do fail, it is when conflicting institutional logics – or
“rationalized myths” – create turmoil, contestation and inertia. Such
appears to be the Polish case, with ample evidence of compensatory
behavior of dubious value towards the achievement of either set of most
desirable ends.
These findings occasion a word of warning regarding policies that
assume the historically grounded institution of the university can be re-
oriented as an instrument for achieving state priorities with an optimal
balance of carrots and state-of-the-art sticks – especially in a post-
communist context with an entrenched association between national
and academic self-determination. From a second-order systems per-
spective, reforms most likely to succeed are not those that aptly balance
punishments and rewards, but those that “hit” the right note in the
system’s root identity. In the Polish case, it appears that the institutional
identity most likely to align with the “desirable ends” of social and
economic development is that of Technical University (politechnika) –
an unsurprising finding given its profile and long-standing traditions of
cooperating with industry. The finding is consistent with Stinchcombe’s
(1968) observation of a “correlation between the time in history that a
particular type of organization was invented and the social structure of
that type which exists at the present time.” (p. 143). What does appear
surprising is the “academic drift” of Vocational HEI, an institution es-
tablished in the 1990s for the express purpose of practical training, yet
aspiring to drop its adjective and be a “normal” university. In this case,
it would appear that the predominance of faculty teams (“cell co-
lonies”) imported directly from Flagship University determined the
replication of an earlier organizational paradigm (“DNA”) rather than
the creation of a new one.
The findings of this study warn that unless the distinct and resilient
organizational identities of different types of HEIs are assumed by
policymakers to be very real in their consequences, reform is likely to
produce compensatory adaptations and “reform fatigue” rather than
meaningful change. What might this mean in practice? If the only
change worthy of public resources is one that shifts the pattern of
identity embedded in an organization’s daily, discursive self-description
(Lenartowicz, 2018), the most obvious place to start would be serious
investigation on organizational identity as expressed in the daily com-
munication of its agents. In addition, if the outcome of market-relevant
skills and innovations was absent from the root model of traditional
universities, it is certainly a root identity of many other institutions that
have so far not received equal government attention as traditional
universities. In Poland, private HEIs, NGOs and foundations sprung up
to fill the niche, with some developing highly innovative educational
programs deserving of public support. Institutions such as these are
examples of new organizational structures built up within the last
twenty years to address some of the very same needs that the govern-
ment has tried to pressure traditional HEIs to fulfill. Given the doubtful
success of earlier approaches, policymakers might consider diversifying
public investment in different types of educational structures for dif-
ferent purposes. There is no doubt that traditional universities still have
a part to play in pushing the boundaries of knowledge and preparing
broadly educated elites – that is the milk they are built to produce. Yet
perhaps it is time they were no longer required to plow fields, since
there are other types of HEIs with proven track-records of excellence
that could prove deserving of public investment.
Acknowledgements
The author gratefully acknowledges the support of the Foundation
for Polish Science (Grant 5./2015: Institutional Autonomy and the Models
of Adaptation of Polish Universities to a Changing Social and Economic
Environment) and the support of the principal investigator, Prof. Marek
Kwiek. The author also wishes to thank Prof. David Chapman for his
assistance in framing and conducting this study and Dr. Marta
Lenartowicz for an introduction to the theoretical lens of autopoisesis.
M.A. Shaw International Journal of Educational Development 69 (2019) 9–21
19
Appendix A. Coding System
Appendix B. Visual Representation of Participant Views
References
Agasisti, T., Catalano, G., 2006. Governance models of university systems—towards
quasi‐markets? Tendencies and perspectives: a European comparison. J. High. Educ.
Policy Manag. 28 (3), 245–262. https://doi.org/10.1080/13600800600980056.
Bok, D., 2009. Universities in the Marketplace: The Commercialization of Higher
Education. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Braun, D., Merrien, F.X., 1999. Governance of universities and modernisation of the state:
analytical aspects. In: Braun, D., Merrien, F.X. (Eds.), Towards a New Model of
Governance for Universities? Kingsley, London, pp. 9–33.
Capano, G., Regini, M., 2014. Governance reforms and organizational dilemmas in
European universities. Comp. Educ. Rev. 58 (1), 73–103.
Clark, B.R., 1986. The Higher Education System: Academic Organization in Cross-
National Perspective. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA.
Dobbins, M., Knill, C., 2009. Higher education policies in Central and Eastern Europe:
convergence toward a common model? Governance 22 (3), 397–430.
Dobbins, Michael, 2011. Higher Education Policies in Central and Eastern Europe:
Convergence Towards a Common Model? Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills,
Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York.
Dobbins, Michael, 2017. Exploring higher education governance in Poland and Romania:
re-convergence after divergence? Eur. Educ. Res. J. 16 (5), 684–704. https://doi.org/
10.1177/1474904116684138.
European Social Survey. (2018, January 25). Retrieved January 25, 2018, from http://
www.europeansocialsurvey.org/.
Fuller, B. (n.d.). The countdown begins. Retrieved from https://www.bfi.org/ideaindex/
projects/2015/greenwave.
Geertz, C., 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures. Basic Books.
Gornitzka, A., Maassen, P., 2000. Hybrid steering approaches with respect to European
higher education. High. Educ. Policy 13 (3), 267–285.
Gornitzka, Å., Maassen, P., 2017. European Flagship universities: autonomy and change.
High. Educ. Q. 71 (3), 231–238. https://doi.org/10.1111/hequ.12130.
Gornitzka, A., Maassen, P., Olsen, J.P., Stensaker, B., 2007. “Europe of Knowledge:”
Search for a New Pact. University dynamics and European integration, pp. 181–214.
Heinze, T., Knill, C., 2008. Analysing the differential impact of the Bologna process:
theoretical considerations on national conditions for international policy con-
vergence. High. Educ. 56 (4), 493–510.
Hotho, S., 2013. Higher education change and its managers: alternative constructions.
Fig. B1. Policymakers.
In the following figures, the size of the dot corresponds to the number of segments coded in a given interview. Calculation of symbol size refers to the column.
Fig. B2. Academic Leaders.
M.A. Shaw International Journal of Educational Development 69 (2019) 9–21
20
Educ. Manag. Adm. Leadersh. 41 (3), 352–371. https://doi.org/10.1177/
1741143212474806.
Katz, D., Kahn, R.L., 1966. Organizations and the system concept. The Social Psychology
of Organizations. John Wiley & Sons, New York, pp. 14–29.
King, R.P., 2007. Governance and accountability in the higher education regulatory state.
High. Educ.: Int. J. High. Educ. Educ. Plann. 53 (4), 411–430.
Krücken, G., 2003. Learning the ‘New, New Thing’: on the role of path dependency in
university structures. High. Educ. 46 (3), 315–339. https://doi.org/10.1023/
A:1025344413682.
Kulczycki, E., 2017. Assessing publications through a bibliometric indicator: the case of
comprehensive evaluation of scientific units in Poland. Res. Eval. 26 (1), 41–52.
https://doi.org/10.1093/reseval/rvw023.
Kwiek, M., 2012. Higher education reforms and their socio-economic contexts: shifting
funding regimes and competing social narratives. In: Kwiek, M., Maassen, P. (Eds.),
National Higher Education Reforms in a European Context: Comparative Reflections
on Poland and Norway. Peter Lang., Bern, pp. 155–176.
Kwiek, M., 2015. The unfading power of collegiality? University governance in Poland in
a European comparative and quantitative perspective. Int. J. Educ. Dev. 43, 77–89.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijedudev.2015.05.002.
Lenartowicz, M., 2015. The nature of the university. High. Educ. 69 (6), 947–961.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-014-9815-0.
Lenartowicz, M., 2018. Financing organizational changes from without: a valid instru-
ment or a costly illusion of strategic public policy? J. Account. Organ. Change 14 (1),
99–116. https://doi.org/10.1108/JAOC-12-2016-0083.
Levine, A., 1980. Why Innovation Fails: The Institutionalization and Termination of
Innovation in Higher Education. SUNY Press, New York.
Luhmann, N., 2009. Self-organization and autopoiesis. In: Clarke, B., Hansen, M.B.N.
(Eds.), Emergence and Embodiment: New Essays on Second-Order Systems Theory,
pp. 143–156.
Maassen, P.A., Olsen, J.P. (Eds.), 2007. University Dynamics and European Integration.
Springer.
Magalhaes, R., Sanchez, R., 2009. Autopoiesis in Organization Theory and Practice.
Emerald Group Publishing, Bingley.
Marginson, S., 2018. High participation systems of higher education. In: Cantwell, B.,
Marginson, S., Smolentseva, A. (Eds.), High Participation Systems of Higher
Education. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 3–38.
Menzel, H., 1978. Meaning: who needs it? In: Brenner, M., Marsh, P., Brenner, M. (Eds.),
The Social Contexts of Method. St. Martin’s Press, New York, pp. 140–171.
Meyer, J.W., Rowan, B., 1977. Institutionalized organizations: formal structure as myth
and ceremony. Am. J. Sociol. 340–363.
Olsen, J.P., 2007. The institutional dynamics of the European university. In: Maassen, P.,
Olsen, J.P. (Eds.), University Dynamics and European Integration. Springer,
Dordrecht, pp. 25–53.
Pabian, P., Sima, K., Kyncilova, L., 2011. Humboldt goes to the labour market: how
academic higher education fuels labour market success in the Czech Republic. J.
Educ. Work. 24 (1–2), 95–118.
Pechar, H., 2012. The decline of an academic oligarchy. The Bologna process and
‘Humboldt’s last warriors’. In: Curaj, A., Scott, P., Vlasceanu, L., Wilson, L. (Eds.),
European Higher Education at the Crossroads. Springer, Netherlands, pp. 613–630.
Retrieved from http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-94-007-3937-6_
33#page-1.
Péteri, G., 2000. On the legacy of state socialism in academia. In: David-Fox, M., Péteri, G.
(Eds.), Academia in Upheaval: Origins, Transfers, and Transformations of the
Communist Academic Regime in Russia and East Central Europe. Bergin & Garvey,
Westport, CT, pp. 275–302.
Poland, 2010. Założenia do nowelizacji ustawy – Prawo o szkolnictwie wyższym oraz
ustawy o stopniach naukowych i tytule naukowym oraz o stopniach i tytule w zak-
resie sztuki. (Proposal of reform to The Act on Academic Degrees and Title and on
Degrees and Title in Art of 23rd March 2003.). Ministry of Science and Higher
Education, Warsaw.
Poland, 2018. Ustawa z dnia 20 lipca 2018: Prawo o szkolnictwie wyższym i nauce
(Statute from 20 July 2018: Law on Higher Education and Science), Pub. L. No. 1668,
1. Retrieved from http://konstytucjadlanauki.gov.pl/content/uploads/2018/08/kdn.
pdf.
Polish Graduate Tracking System, 2018. Retrieved April 4, 2018, from http://ela.nauka.
gov.pl/en/.
Pritchard, R., 2004. Humboldtian values in a changing world: staff and students in
German universities. Oxf. Rev. Educ. 30 (4), 509–528.
Psacharopoulos, G., 1989. Why educational reforms fail: a comparative analysis. Int. Rev.
Educ. 35 (2), 179–195. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00598437.
Ramirez, F., Tiplic, D., 2014. In pursuit of excellence? Discursive patterns in European
higher education research. High. Educ. 67 (4), 439–455. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s10734-013-9681-1. 00181560.
Gazeta Wyborcza (2013, October 1). Rektor UW na inauguracji roku: “Uniwersytet to nie
firma” (Rector of Warsaw University at the inauguration:’ The university is not a
firm’).Retrieved from http://m.warszawa.gazeta.pl/warszawa/1,106541,14706069,
Rektor_UW_na_inauguracji_roku___Uniwersytet_to_nie.html.
Schaaper, M., 2014. The case for graduate education: does university-based research
really lead to national economic development? Montreal In: Chapman, D.W., Chien,
C.-L. (Eds.), Higher Education in Asia: Expanding Out, Expanding up. UNESCO
Institute for Statistics, Montreal, pp. 49–64.
Schriewer, J., 2009. “Rationalized myths” in European higher education: the construction
and diffusion of the bologna model. Eur. Educ. 41 (2), 31–51.
Schwandt, T.A., 2000. Three epistemological stances in qualitative inquiry: inter-
pretivism, hermeneutics, social constructivism. In: Denzin, N.K., Lincoln, Y.S. (Eds.),
Handbook of Qualitative Research, 2nd ed. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, pp. 189–213.
Seidl, D., 2016. Organisational Identity and Self-Transformation: An Autopoietic
Perspective. Routledge.
Shaw, M.A., 2018. Public accountability versus academic independence: tensions of
public higher education governance in Poland. Studies in Higher Education. https://
doi.org/10.1080/03075079.2018.1483910.
Shaw, M.A., Lenartowicz, M., 2016. Humboldt is (not) dead: A social systems perspective
on reforming European universities. In: Wie Bildung organisiert wird (Ed.),
Soziologische Analysen zu Schule, Berufsbildung, Hochschule und Weiterbildung.
(How education gets organized: Sociological analyses of schools, vocational, higher,
and continuing education. BeltzJuventa Verlag, Weinheim/Munchen, pp. 272–274.
Simonová, N., Antonowicz, D., 2006. Czech and polish higher education–from bureau-
cracy to market competition. Czech Sociol. Rev. 42 (3), 517–536.
Stinchcombe, A., 1968. Social structure and organizations. In: March, J. (Ed.), Handbook
of Organizations. Rand McNally, Chicago, pp. 142–193.
Sztompka, P., 1993. Civilizational incompetence: the trap of post-communist societies. Z.
Soziol. 22 (2), 85–95.
Tavoletti, E., 2010. Matching higher education with the labour market in the knowledge
economy: the much-needed reform of university governance in Italy. Ind. High. Educ.
24 (5), 361–375 https://doi.org/Article.
Thomas, W.I., Znaniecki, F., 1927. The Polish Peasant in Europe and America. Alfred A.
Knopf, New York.
Trakman, L., 2008. Modelling university governance. High. Educ. Q. 62 (1–2), 63–83.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2273.2008.00384.x.
Von Bertalanffy, L., 1968. General System Theory: Foundations, Development,
Applications. George Braziller, Inc., New York.
Wildavsky, B., Kelly, A.P., Carey, K., Harvard University, G. S. of E, 2011. Reinventing
Higher Education: The Promise of Innovation. Harvard Education Press.
World Bank, 2017. World Development Indicators | Data. Retrieved January 29, 2018,
from https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.
Zha, Q., 2009. Diversification or homogenization in higher education: a global allo-
morphism perspective. High. Educ. Eur. 34 (3–4), 459–479.
Zysiak, A., 2016. Punkty za pochodzenie: Powojenna modernizacja i uniwersytet w ro-
botniczym mieście (Points for social background: Post-war modernization and the
university in a working-class city). Nomos, Krakow.
M.A. Shaw International Journal of Educational Development 69 (2019) 9–21
21
